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Abstract—The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) has lead
to a dramatic increase in type, quantity, and the number of
functions that can be offered in a smart environment. Future
smart environments will be even richer in terms of number
of devices and functionality provided by them. This poses two
major challenges a) an end user has to search through a vast
number of IoT devices to identify the suitable devices that
satisfy their preferences, and b) it is extremely difficult for
users to manually define fine-grained security policies to support
workflows involving multiple functions.
This paper introduces an intelligent new approach to overcome
these challenges by a) enabling users to describe their required
functionalities in the form of activity workflow, b) automatically
selecting a group of devices to satisfy users functional require-
ments and maximise their preferences over device usage, c)
systematically generating local network access control policies to
ensure enforce the principle of least privilege. We study different
heuristic search algorithms to find the preferred devices for
a given workflow. Experiments results show that the Genetic
Algorithm is the best, among the algorithms that we test, as it
offers a balance between efficiency and effectiveness.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, workflow, security policy,
user preference.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm is the next techno-
logical revolution in the era of computing [1], [2]. Many of
the objects that surround us are being replaced by networked
things to form smart environments such as connected home,
offices, buildings, and cities [2]. In 2018, the number of IoT
devices used in smart homes and buildings has reached 1.2
billion, double any other IoT applications (e.g. smart cities or
industrial IoT) [3]. Tens or even hundreds of IoT devices are
expected to be found in a shared smart environment such as
a residential house or shared commercial premises in the near
future. With the increasing number of consumer IoT devices,
managing access control of these devices becomes very chal-
lenging. This is compounded by the trend for automation to be
no longer limited to the control of individual IoT devices (e.g.
turning a single light on or off). Users can automate an activity
that may involve multiple IoT devices. For example, a user can
create an activity so that when s/he wakes up the alarm clock
turns light on, opens the window, and triggers a coffee maker
to start brewing. Such automation is now supported by many
IoT automation frameworks such as NodeRed [4], Stringify
[5], Zapier [6], and Microsoft flow [7]. These frameworks
utilise flow-based programming [8] to facilitate automation of
IoT-enabled activities.
Though automating activities in smart environment may
increase the quality of life, it is at the cost of the risk
of compromised IoT devices. Which attackers can utilise to
perform denial-of-service attacks, move laterally within the
internal network or take over control of other IoT devices [9],
[10]. For instance, in the previous example, a compromised
alarm clock can open the window for a physical breach. Many
solutions have been proposed for enhancing IoT security [11]–
[15]. Among them many are based on extending existing
security methods (e.g IDS [13], IPS [16], Network Isolation
[11]) to suite new IoT scenarios. For example, intrusion
detection requires establishing a baseline of normal activities
performed frequently by users and detect unusual activities as
abnormal events. Another approach is to enforce least privilege
using network Access Control Lists (ACLs) which define what
connections should be allowed or denied [17]–[19]. ACLs
policies to be defined manually by network administrators.
We would not expect ordinary users to have the expertise
to define such policies. Instead we propose an approach
where users declare what functions they want to automate and
automatically a) select suitable IoT devices based on users’
preferences, b) generate a security policy that enforces least
privilege among the selected devices.
In this paper we adopt the following threat model. There are
different types of possible IoT attacks due to vulnerabilities
in confidentiality, integrity, and access control. A systematic
evaluation of privacy and security for consumer IoT devices,
presented in [20], shows that the majority of threats are due
to vulnerabilities in access control. Unauthorised access attack
arises mainly from two sources [21]: a) attacks from the local
area networks (LANs) [22], and b) attacks from the Internet
[20]. Unauthorised access from the LAN can be originated
from i) other IoT devices due to cross-device interactions, and
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ii) general purpose devices resides inside the local network.
The latter can be mitigated by network segmentation [11]
and is not the focus of this paper. This paper addresses local
threats against IoT devices in the situation when IoT-to-IoT
unauthorised access can happen in a smart environment such
as fog computing in smart home networks [9], [10].
Existing works using offline/pre-defined policies such as
manufacturer usage descriptions (MUD) [23] are not sufficient
for dynamic IoT environments [19]. The MUDs are defined
offline by IoT vendors to specifiy what network access is
required for a particular IoT device to work properly [23].
For example, a coffee maker may only require inbound and
outbound access to a cloud service on TCP port 443. MUDs
can also be defined by a security expert [24]. However,
in general predefined policies are not fine-grained enough,
especially for local connections. For example, MUD may
allow a device to establish local connections but it can’t
specify precisely the IP addresses and ports that devices should
have access to. This is due to the context-dependent nature of
device usage. For example, imagine a scenario where a user
wants the morning alarm clock to trigger the coffee maker
for the morning coffee. In this case, the least privilege would
restrict network access so that only the alarm clock is allowed
to access the coffee maker, rather than every single device
in the network. You cannot specify this with a MUD, the
best that a MUD can do is restrict access to being between
devices by specific manufacturers. This doesn’t take account
the preferences or the needs of the user. Therefore, there is a
need to generate automatically and dynamically ACL policies
according to how devices are actually be used to support users’
new and ongoing activities.
One approach to automatic policy generation is to capture
all kinds of benign traffic in relation to any targeted IoT
devices offline [24], [25], and parse the captured traffic to
generate a policy to be enforced in the deployment [24], [25].
Although this approach can generate fine-grained policies, it
requires the training process to cover all possible usage of a
device which is unfeasible for many IoT devices. Further, this
approach doesn’t follow the principle of least privilege because
it difficult to determine precisely all allowed local endpoints
since some aren’t specified until deployment takes place. In
view of this problem, we have developed a new technique
for automatic policy generation for IoT devices based on the
activities workflows provided by the users at the deployment.
We base our technique around the concept of workflow
that doesn’t specify which device to use. Workflows are
common way to build and share automated activities in IoT
automation platforms such as NodeRed [4], Stringify [5], and
Microsoft flow [7]. Users are not always interested in manually
specifying all the devices to be used for any activity. They
are more interested in describing the required functionalities
in an abstract way, for example, in the form of a flow of
functions. However, currently a workflow is often tied to
the underlying devices [4], [5], [26]–[28], such that a user
can’t use any pre-defined workflows unless he/she has exactly
the same collection of devices specified in the flow [4], [5].
Fig. 1: Functional workflow abstraction
However, s/he may have alternative devices that can be used
to accomplish the same activity.
Decoupling workflow’s functions from underlying devices
enables users to share and re-use many existing flows. The
concept of workflow abstraction based on device function is
depicted in Fig. 1. For example, instead of building a flow
by selecting the devices, Brand B alarm triggers Brand A
coffee maker, flow can be defined in an abstract way as alarm
triggers coffee maker, see 1. At the deployment our proposed
system can automatically select the underlying suitable devices
(e.g. Brand B alarm and Brand A coffee maker) based on the
flow requirements and user preference. Hence, users can focus
on what the activity function rather than the device selection
which can be tidies task in large IoT network.
Further supported by a user preference model, our proposed
approach can automatically select the suitable alarm and coffee
maker to use from multiple alternative devices by maximising
user preferences. In the context of IoT, user preferences
might capture concerns related to security, privacy or even
perceptions of quality. For example, users may prefer to
use Brand x devices for a sensitive function such as audio
recording due to the security reputation of their manufacturer.
Other factors that may derive users’ preference are how good
or bad a manufacturer’s privacy agreement and the quality
of the device, for example, the flavor of coffee made by
coffee makers. Hence while selecting devices with respect to
any workflow, users preferences must always be treated with
priority.
Existing research has considered the problem regarding
how to automatically predict users activities using a set of
sensors [29], [30]. The key idea is to analyse user activities
to predict what activities user may need next. This paper will
propose a complementary approach, as we assume that the
workflow for any important activity is given a priori, perhaps
by using the methods developed in [29], [30]. Our system
subsequently finds the most preferable set of devices to satisfy
users workflow by fulfilling all functionality requirements in
the workflow and maximising users preferences. All kinds of
information about a device can be used to build a preference
model for a user. There are many excellent technologies to
accurately learn preference models in the literature [31]. Any
such technology can work well in our proposed system. Based
on the chosen devices network access control policy can
be established automatically to facilitate inter-communication
among these devices while obeying the least privilege princi-
ple.
Our main contributions of this paper are:
1) Instead of binding workflow activities/applications to
specific devices, we successfully decouple the functional
flow of IoT applications from the underlying devices to
enable easy sharing and flexible re-using of existing IoT
workflows.
2) We present the first mathematical formulation of user
activities automation as a constraint optimisation prob-
lem with the goal of selecting a set of required devices
to fulfil functional requirements and maximise users’
preferences.
3) We also develop a simple method to systematically
generate fine-grained network access policies to support
users’ activities in a secure manner.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II
presents related works. In Sections III and IV, we formulate
network model and user preference model. Then in Section V
we present the formulation of the device selection problem.
The algorithms studied by us to address device selection
is further presented in Section VI. Based on the solution,
the technique for automatic policy generation is subsequently
detailed in Section VII. Evaluation and results follow in
section VIII and conclusion in section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we introduce the related research in access
control for cross-device IoT interactions. And illustrate the
related challenges, and highlight the technical and practical
importance of automatic policy generation. We then discuss
the related works in workflow, user preference, and least
privilege access principle in the IoT domain.
Researchers proposed different access control models such
as Mandatory access control (MAC), discretionary access
control (DAC), and role based access control (RBAC). MAC
requires subjects (e.g. users) to be classified into different
security levels based on their role/trustworthiness. Objects
will also be categorised similarly based on their sensitivity
[32]. Access policy decides which subject class can access
what object category. MAC is not entirely suitable for IoT.
The interaction between the devices can’t be easily mapped
to classes, and IoT required a level of dynamicity which
is missing in MAC [12], [17], [33]. In contrast to MAC,
DAC enables users to set access rules for the objects they
own. Substantial research has been performed to include
end-users input to build IoT security control [34]–[37]. For
example, Neto et al. [34] proposed a cryptographic suite
protocol (AoT) for authentication and access control which
is driven by users input. In [36], authors integrated RBAC
with social network services and allowed end-users to define
personalised access policy to govern device sharing. IoTSec
[11] proposed a policy language that allows users to expressive
policy for cross-device interactions. In these research works,
users input drives fine-grained access control in consideration
of social and environmental factors. However, heavily relying
on users’ involvement, increasing users’ burden and prevent
wide adoption. Therefore, this work proposed to automatically
generate the policy for IoT given an activity workflow.
Workflow has been supported by many IoT frameworks
such as NodeRed [4], Stringify [5], and Microsoft flow [7]
to realise network activity automation. Researchers also used
activity workflow to optimise latency and reduce bandwidth
and utilise fog computing to enable distributed processing of
activity workflow [26], [28]. Liang et al. utilised IoT data flow
to ensure safety by verifying that any flow should never violate
the safety policy [37]. We propose to use IoT activity work-
flows to a) automatically select the most preferable devices
from a pool of candidates and b) generate network policy to
enforce the least privilege access across the selected devices.
Researchers have studied the possibility of automatically
deriving and predicting users activity [29], [30]. Rashidi et
al. [29] proposed Apriori algorithm to detect activity patterns
in smart home environment to automate users activities. Sim-
ilarly [30] used Bayesian network to learn and predict users
activities which can be used to generate personalised activities.
These works focused predicting and automating users activities
which can be represented as workflow, however, it didn’t tackle
how to build it and which devices will be used. Therefore,
our goal is to a) select all devices that fulfil a workflow
requirements and b) Choosing devices from the selected list
that maximise user preference. For example, a user may prefer
to use a brand A devices for temperature sensing while prefer
brand B for thermostat function. In association with selected
devices, policies will be generated automatically to ensure
least privilege access, and segregate devices used by different
users to protect their privacy.
The main objective of MUD is to introduce the least
privilege access required for IoT devices. However, as MUD
policy is generated prior to the deployment it cannot define
all access endpoints with fine granularity, especially local
ones [19]. In contrast to the MUD policy, we propose to
use a user defined activity workflow to drive automatic policy
establishment. Trimanada et al. [38] proposed Vigilia, which
uses capability-based RMI access control to derive access
control policy. However, it requires predefined capability-base
access to specify the access between different type of devices
prior to the depolyment. This requirement limits the interaction
of a device to what is pre-defined in its driver. Sorensen et al.
[24] developed a firewall that automatically generates profiles
(i.e. policies) for IoT devices by monitoring their traffic during
learning phase. Then enforce the learned policies during the
depolyment. This approach work well, but it requires the
devices to generate all possible traffic during the learning
phase. However, we target the activity automation workflow
so that policies can be automatically generated to ensure least
privilege access to devices that are part of the workflow
III. NETWORK MODEL
We model a network as a collection of devices represented
by N = {di : i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n}. Each device d in the network
is represented by a tuple of a set of attributes Att(d), a set
capabilities Cap(d), and a set of network requirements for a
particular function f , given by Netreq(d, f) (see eq. 1).
∀d ∈ N, d =< Att(d), Cap(d), Netreq(d, f) > (1)
Each attribute a ∈ Att(d) corresponds to a device-specific
property that may derive users’ preferences of using the device
over the others. For example, a coffee maker can have several
attributes such as brand, quality of coffee produced, time
required. On the other hand, the set of capabilities Cap(d) of
device d refers to the group of functions that can be executed
by the device. A device can have multiple attributes and can
support one or multiple capabilities. For example, in Fig. 1 the
first coffee maker has attributes of Brand A and can quickly
prepare coffee (i.e. speed), while it has only one capability
which is making coffee. The network requirements R for
a device d to execute a function f ∈ Cap(d) is given by
Netreq(d, f) (see eq. 2). Such that r ∈ R is a tuple of required
access to the network for a device d to execute a function
f ∈ F , where F is the set of workflow functions. Network
requirements Netreq function will be utilised for automatic
policy generation, to be introduced in Section VII.
∀d ∈ Ds, f ∈ F : R = Netreq(f, d) (2)
Network requirements can be extracted based on several
existing techniques such as capturing and analysing IoT traf-
fic [24], [25]. In the context of this paper, the goal is to
identify a list of protocols used by the device rather than the
communication endpoints (e.g. IP address and port). Network
requirements can also be extracted from MUD, which clearly
defines the type of protocols used by specific devices. How-
ever, MUD can’t specify precisely the endpoints that devices
should have access to prior to deployment. However, we utilise
the workflow to define the endpoints for a device.
A user drives the operations in a network by creating one or
multiple activities as functional workflows for the network to
fulfil. A functional workflow W is represented as a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) W =< F,E >, where F is a set of
functions, and E is the dependencies among them. For a
workflow W to be feasible, we must ensure that each function
f ∈ F can be executed by at least one device in the network
N (see eq. 3).
∀f ∈ F, ∃ d , f ∈ Cap(d) (3)
Meanwhile every edge e ∈ E represents the dependencies
between a pair of functions. For example, in Fig. 1 the coffee
making function depends on the alarm function. In other
words, only after an alarm is triggered that a coffee maker can
start to make coffee. To support this dependency, we should
permit the communication between a specific alarm device and
a specific coffee maker chosen to fulfil the workflow.
IV. USER PREFERENCE MODEL
In order to determine the suitable devices for a workflow, we
adopt a flexible user preference model M(F,D) to quantify
user preferences of using any devices for various functions.
user preference model can answer questions like how likely a
user will prefer to use any subset of devices D ⊆ N for a given
workflow of functions F . We can use any preference models
flexibly in our proposed system. Such a users preference
model can also be obtained by using a variety of machine
learning techniques such as preference logic, fuzzy logic,
neural networks [31].
However in our experiments, we chose to use Bayesian net-
works technique to represent user preference model. Bayesian
network [39] is a common technique for modelling user
preferences and predict users activities [30], [40], [41]. For ex-
ample, the preference model in Fig. 2 can tell our system that
our user prefers to use Brand A alarm device and Brand B
coffee maker, their join probability is the highest among any
other combination. According to the graphical structure of
the Bayesian network, we can easily calculate the probability
for the user to prefer using any group of devices together.
Certainly, the higher the probability (i.e. the joint probability),
the more preferable the corresponding group of devices would
be to support any specific activities.
Bayesian network can be constructed based on historical
data regarding devices usage in various workflows functions.
In fact previously developed learning algorithms can learn the
network structure (i.e. graph representation DAG) as well as
the parameters (i.e. probability distribution P ) from complete
or incomplete data [40]. One approach is to find the network
that maximises the likelihood of the data using search algo-
rithms [42]. In [30], Wu et al. successfully construct Bayesian
Network using activity dataset [43] to accurately predict user
activity. Similarly Bayesian network can be constructed from
a dataset of historical workflows. Moreover, users historical
workflows include the dependencies between the functions,
which can be used to guide the structure learning of the
Bayesian network. User preference modelling is not the central
focus of this paper. We rely on existing machine learning
techniques and will not investigate this issue further.
V. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Given a network model N , user preference model M(F,D),
and a workflow W =< F,E >, how to determining the set
of devices Ds ⊆ N . Such that Ds fulfils all functions F in
the workflow W and maximises user preference.
We formulate this problem as following:
INPUT: (N,W (F,E),M(F,Di)).
OUTPUT: d ∈ Ds ⊆ N
OBJECTIVE:
argmax
Di⊆N
M(F,Di) (4)
s.t. ∀f ∈ F ∃ d , f ∈ Cap(d)
Search algorithms will be used to find the set of devices that
maximise user preference among all devices in the network
N that satisfy the flow requirements F . Such that for any set
Fig. 2: User preference representation using Bayesian network
for the example in Fig. 1.
of devices Di a query will be sent to the preference model
M(Di, F ) to get the associated preference probability score.
Then the devices with the highest score will be selected to
implement the workflow functions.
VI. SOLUTION SEARCHING METHODS
We study three common optimisation algorithms to tackle
the device selection problem in eq.(4). We focus on hill
climbing (HC) and simulated annealing (SA) as two represen-
tative local optimisation methods as well as genetic algorithm
(GA) as a typical global optimisation method. We also study
the Brut-Force search and to what extend it can scale. The
intention is to test which algorithm is more suitable to solve
this problem in terms of scalability, efficiency and solution
quality.
As a simple search technique, HC starts with arbitrary
selection of devices and gradually improve users preferences
by changing some of the devices that support the activity
workflow. We choose to use Hill-climbing as it is highly
efficient. However this technique can be easily trapped by local
optima and may not scale well to large problems. To address
this issue, we have also studied SA [44] which can escape
the local optima by allowing less optimal movement based
on a probability function. GA is a well-known evolutionary
computing algorithm and has been widely demonstrated to
perform well on many difficult combinatorial optimisation
problems. On the other hand, Brute-force algorithm is system-
atically enumerating all possible candidates for the solution
and selecting the best candidate. It is guaranteed to find the
optimal solution, however, it can’t scale to large problem.
The pseudo code for device selection in Algorithm 1 re-
quires a network N , a preference model M , and a workflow W
as inputs. Algorithm 1 starts by filtering network devices and
only select devices Dcands that satisfy workflow requirements
(i.e. F ) (see eq. 5).
∀d ∈ Dcands ⊆ N, f ∈ F : f ∈ Cap(d) (5)
The selected devices Ds is initialised with a random device
candidates. Then each of the searching algorithm performs
the following steps until it reach its termination condition
(based on the settings, to be discussed later); a) selects a
new candidate solution Di = alg(Dcands, F ); b) uses the
preference model to score its accuracy M(Di, F ); c) and
decide whether to replace the existing candidate Ds by Di
based on its internal mechanism.
Data: N,W < F,E >,M
Result: scores, Ds ⊆ N
Dcands = flow req(N,F ) ;
Ds = getRandomCand(Dcands, F ) ;
scores =M(Ds, F ) ;
while not termination condition do
Di = searchalg(Dcands, F ) ;
scorei =M(Di, F ) ;
scores, Ds = searchalg(Di, Ds) ;
end
Algorithm 1: Device selection searching algorithm
VII. POLICY GENERATION
In the previous section, we discussed the algorithms to
be exploited for addressing the device selection problem.
In association with the solution to the problem a set of
network access rules must be established to support the activity
workflow and enforce the least privilege principle. We focus
on network access control and assume authentication, such
as key-based authentication [45], is supported in the network.
Automatically generated policies can be subsequently enforced
by any existing enforcing mechanisms developed for IoT such
as Software Defined Networking [46].
The idea is to derive network ACLs policy for the workflow
selected devices Ds to fulfil the network requirements R (see
eq. 2) for each device to execute the assigned function.
Network requirements can include destination IP ad-
dresses, transport protocol, and port numbers, bandwidth,
duration. In this work we only consider source and desti-
nation IP addresses, destination port, and the TCP protocol
{src ip : sourceIP, dest ip : destination IP, dest port :
destination port, tp proto : transport protocol}. These
requirements can be easily mapped to ACL policy to guarantee
that the selected devices Ds can execute th workflow and
obey the least privilege principle. The ACL policy can be
easily enforced within and on the border of the network using
software define networking [46].
VIII. EVALUATION
We performed an empirical evaluation of four search algo-
rithms to determine which one best suits our device selection
problem (see eq. 4) for typical smart home IoT. The evaluation
metrics are the quality of the solution in terms of user
preference and time efficiency.
A. Experiment setup
We fine-tuned the hyper-parameters for GA and SA and
found that the parameter settings summarised in Table I can
enable the two algorithms to perform reasonably well.
TABLE I: Experiment GP and SA parameters
Genetic Algorithm
Parameter Value
Generations 1000
Population size |F | * 200
Crossover rate 0.7
Mutation rate 0.2
Elitism rate 0.1
Selection Method Tournament
Tournament size 3
Simulated Annealing
Parameter Value
Steps 200000
Max temperature 0.2
Min temperature 0.0001
We compared algorithms in terms of scalability and ef-
ficiency by using multiple workflows composed of 4 to 7
functions (i.e. |F | = 4, 5, 6, 7), where each function has 7
alternative devices in the network N , see Table II. Note the
search space is |F |7.
TABLE II: Experiment Settings
No Workflow functions |F | 4, 5,6,7
Optimal user preference P (Ds) 0.34, 0.42, 0.3, 0.24
No Network Devices |N | rand(|F |, 4 ∗ |F |)
No Device capabilities rand(2, 7)
No alternative devices 7
Experiment runs 30
A user preference model is constructed as a random
Bayesian Network where each node represents a function and
its values are the alternative devices. To verify the effectiveness
of the search algorithms, we mimic user preference by tuning
the Bayesian network probability distribution. We do that by
randomly selecting a set of devices as preferred by the user and
maximising their joint probability. This is achieved by simply
by setting all conditional probabilities related to the desired
collection of devices to be p1/|F | so that the joint probability
will be p. For example, in Fig. 2 to set user preference
to alarming using Brand A device and making coffee using
Brand B we set their conditional probability to be 0.61/2, the
probability P (CM = Brand B,A = Brand A) = 0.6. Ta-
ble II shows the generated optimal user preference probability
P (Ds) to (0.34, 0.42, 0.3, 0.24) for each composed workflow
of 4, 5, 6and7 functions respectively. These values are used in
the evaluation to verify the search algorithms.
B. Results and discussion
The results shows that HC, as expected, is often trapped
into local optima solutions, meaning it doesn’t select devices
for the workflow function that are most preferred according
to the preference model. The effectiveness of HC deteriorates
sharply with the increasing number of workflow functions, as
shown in Fig. 3a. SA and GA both can always find the optimal
solution, see Fig. 3a. We verify the optimality of the solution
using the known user optimal preference probability shown in
Table II.
(a) User preference optimisation
(b) Time efficiency
Fig. 3: Device selection heuristic algorithms comparison
On the other hand, the search algorithms vary in terms of the
time they take to reach the solution as shown Fig. 3b. HC is the
most efficient algorithm in terms of elapsed time. However, its
effectiveness is not satisfactory as it is not finding the optimal
set of devices that maximise user preference probability, see
Fig. 3a. SA outperforms HC in terms of effectiveness, but at
high cost of computation efficiency, since it clearly requires
significantly longer computation time. However SA still better
than Brute-Force search which shows an exponential increase
in the time it takes with the increase of number of functions
in a workflow. The best balance between effectiveness and
efficiency can be achieved in our experiments by using GA.
GA produces optimal solution like SA and Brute-Force and
it scales better as shown in Fig 3b. Although Brute-Force
is efficient in small problems, it fails to scale as GA. For
example, in Fig. 3a Brute-Force is more efficient than GA for
problems with workflow of 4 or less functions, however, for
workflow of 5 or more functions the time it takes increases
exponentially.
IX. CONCLUSION
Activity workflows are a common technique for specifying
automation activities in smart environment. In existing sys-
tems, users have to specify the underlying devices to execute
activity. We extend this by allowing users to specify abstract
workflows that are instantiated for the particular environment.
Previous research has not explored the automatic generation
of concrete workflows and enforcement of least privilege
based upon user requirements and preferences. We present
an approach that decouples workflow requirements from the
specific devices so devices can be selected on deployment to
satisfy user preference. We also show how an automatic policy
can be generated given network requirements for executing
a particular workflow function. We formulate user activity
automation as a constraint optimisation task and solve it using
heuristic search algorithms. Our experiments show that for
small network of IoT devices Brute-Force search is reasonably
a good choice for optimising device selection. However, for
larger network GA is the best, among the algorithms that we
test, as it balance between efficiency and effectiveness.
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